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On the Interplay Between Cyber and
Physical Spaces for Adaptive Security
Christos Tsigkanos , Liliana Pasquale, Carlo Ghezzi, Fellow, IEEE, and Bashar Nuseibeh
Abstract—Ubiquitous computing is resulting in a proliferation of cyber-physical systems that host or manage valuable physical and
digital assets. These assets can be harmed by malicious agents through both cyber-enabled or physically-enabled attacks, particularly
ones that exploit the often ignored interplay between the cyber and physical world. The explicit representation of spatial topology is key
to supporting adaptive security policies. In this paper we explore the use of Bigraphical Reactive Systems to model the topology of
cyber and physical spaces and their dynamics. We utilise such models to perform speculative threat analysis through model checking
to reason about the consequences of the evolution of topological configurations on the satisfaction of security requirements. We further
propose an automatic planning technique to identify an adaptation strategy enacting security policies at runtime to prevent, circumvent,
or mitigate possible security requirements violations. We evaluate our approach using a case study concerned with countering insider
threats in a building automation system.
Index Terms—Specification, Verification, Access Control
Ç
1 INTRODUCTION
COMPUTING and communication capabilities are increas-ingly being embedded into physical spaces, blurring the
boundary between cyber and physical worlds [1], and offer-
ing novel attack opportunities to malicious agents [2]. For
example, cyber-enabled physical attacks can occur when
physical assets are cyber-controlled (e.g., digital access con-
trol to buildings). Similarly, physically-enabled cyber attacks
can occurwhen physical access to assets enables cyber attacks
(e.g., access to a particular computer may facilitate malicious
access to digital information held on that computer). Under-
standing and managing the security threats that arise from
the deployment of such cyber-physical systems (CPS) is a key
challenge that is exacerbated by the interplay between the
cyber and physical space (CPSp) that such systems inhabit.
Although the literature is rich in accounts of security risk
assessment methods (e.g., [3], [4]), these methods consider
physical and cyber security separately [5] and are therefore
unable to support the analysis of security threats arising from
the interplay between the cyber and physical spaces that
characterise a CPS operational environment.
In previous work [6] we advocated that the topology of
cyber and physical spaces—their structure in terms of key ele-
ments and their relationships—can provide a system with
both structural and semantic awareness of security relevant
contextual characteristics. These include the location of assets
being protected and the security controls that should be
enacted in their proximity. Moreover, the location of poten-
tiallymalicious agents can increase the threat of harm to assets
in their vicinity. Discovering threats arising from the interplay
between cyber and physical spaces suggests the need for an
explicit representation of the topology of such spaces includ-
ing their dependencies. In previous work [7] we investigated
the use of the Ambient Calculus [8] to represent the topology
of physical spaces to help identify and prevent potential
future violations of security requirements. However, the
Ambient Calculus encodes computation only as process-alge-
braic structural changes in a hierarchy and hinders reasoning
about communication and links, key characteristics of cyber
spaces. Furthermore, it does not allow reasoning about
actions in the cyber space that are enabled by specific condi-
tions in the physical space and vice-versa.
Changes in the topology, often triggered by movements
of objects or agents in the physical or cyber space, can
change a CPS attack surface dynamically. Although the
primitives of change are well understood, their effect on the
satisfaction of security requirements is not easy to predict as
there can be complex sequences of actions leading to a viola-
tion. An adaptive security approach is needed to discover
possible security threats determined by topological changes
and then counteract those by enacting security policies to cir-
cumvent, prevent, or mitigate violations.
In this paper, we propose an approach to engineering
adaptive security for CPS that exploits a formal model of the
topology of cyber and physical spaces to discover and coun-
teract at runtime threats that arise from topological changes.
We do so by choosing to work with a form of Bigraphical Reac-
tive Systems (BRS) [9] as an underlying modelling formalism
and providing novel speculative threat analysis and adaptation
planning techniques to, respectively, discover and counteract
security threats at runtime. Bigraphical Reactive Systems can
express the topology of cyber and physical spaces, their inter-
play, and the security requirements to be satisfied. We enable
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adaptation by maintaining a live model representation of the
CPSp characterising a system’s operational environment. We
perform speculative threat analysis by utilising model check-
ing for reasoning about the consequences that topological
changes can have on the satisfaction of security requirements.
We also propose a planning technique to generate an adapta-
tion strategy that prescribes what security policies to enact in
order to prevent, circumvent, or mitigate possible violations
of security requirements identified through analysis. To sup-
port the proposed analysis and planning techniques, we
implemented a prototype verification tool. We motivate and
illustrate our approach using a case study concerned with a
modern bank branch that provides additional financial serv-
ices through a local cloudlet [10] andmonitored by CCTV and
security guards. We evaluate our approach with respect to
additional requirements formulated following discussions
with an industrial partner concerned with countering insider
threats. Our results demonstrate that our approach can iden-
tify and counteract emerging security threats arising from the
interplay between cyber and physical spaces. The perfor-
mance of our approach also confirms its applicability at run-
time in adapting security policies of realistic systems.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarised
as follows. We provide a novel approach to explicitly and
formally represent the interplay of cyber and physical
spaces in which systems operate. Based on this representa-
tion, we perform security analysis and planning to counter-
act discovered threats automatically and adaptively, by
modifying security policies only when a security violation
can occur. To the best of our knowledge, this represents an
advancement with respect to traditional approaches, which
are often developed based on fixed boundaries and assump-
tions. Our approach also has limitations. In particular, it
does not account for inertia of the physical world in the
selection and enactment of an adaptation strategy. More-
over, like other model-based security approaches in litera-
ture, we assume correctness of the model of the CPSp.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
describes our motivating example and Section 3 presents
our approach for engineering topology aware adaptive
security. Section 4 introduces BRS and how we adopt them
to model the topology of cyber and physical spaces.
Sections 5 and 6 describe the speculative threat analysis and
planning techniques, respectively. Section 7 discusses our
evaluation results and Section 8 describes related work.
Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
To motivate our work on adaptive security for CPS we
introduce an example used throughout the paper. The
example illustrates how changes in the topology of the
cyber and physical spaces that a CPS inhabits can lead to
violations of security requirements.
A modern bank branch offers traditional counter services
as well as advanced online services (e.g., investments, finan-
cial consulting) through an available cloudlet [10], a recent
architectural innovation arising from the convergence of
mobile and cloud computing. It provides fast remote cloud
services to the mobile clients in its physical proximity, i.e.,
connected to the local wireless network. A cloudlet contains
cached state from a remote cloud service and has high con-
nectivity to it. Cloudlets are increasingly being used in
diverse application domains, such as mobile commerce,
healthcare and military defense. In our example, a connec-
tion from a customer’smobile device causes the provisioning
of a new virtual machine (VM) on the cloudlet. The bank
branch also instantiates a Building Automation System
(BAS) comprising an infrastructure for controlling heating,
ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC), as well as CCTV
surveillance and lighting. The host manager located in the
server room controls appliances (lights, HVAC, CCTVs), by
sending commands to the network gateway that, in turn, for-
wards them to the target appliances. Additional devices
include a server, desktop computers containing confidential
documents, and a printer. As commonly found in a bank,
safes containing valuable assets are placed in a safe room.
2.1 When Cyber Meets Physical
The operational environment of our example is shown in
Fig. 1. The physical space includes the structure of the build-
ing; the bank has a main area where counters are placed and
from which it is possible to access the wifi area and a corri-
dor. From the wifi area customers can connect to the local
wireless network to use banking services. A customer con-
nected to the network may request the provisioning of more
than one VM. The cloudlet has a fixed capacity that for this
example we assume to be four VMs. The wifi area delimits
the physical area within which it is possible to connect.1
From the corridor it is possible to access private areas of the
bank, including a server room, offices, a safe room and a
printer room. Fig. 1 also shows the location of physical
objects (e.g., cloudlet, safe) and agents (e.g., bank customers,
security guards) in the space. For example, Eve and Alice
who are bank customers are located in the wifi area, while
the cloudlet, the host manager and the HVAC are placed in
the server room. The topology of the physical space also
describes proximity and reachability relationships. In this
paper, proximity indicates whether entities are co-located;
for example Mallory and Trudy, who are a visiting techni-
cian and a security guard respectively, are co-located in the
same area. Reachability indicates whether an agent can
access a physical entity; for example, Mallory can access the
Fig. 1. Physical and cyber spaces of our example.
1. Without loss of generality and for the sake of this running exam-
ple, we assume wireless connections occur only from the wifi area.
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server room. Like physical spaces, the topology of cyber
spaces represents the structure of digital areas and the loca-
tion of digital objects in such areas, such as bank account
information or VMs. Some objects, such as mobile devices or
the cloudlet, can be conceived both as physical and digital
entities. For example, Alice’s mobile device delimits a digital
area containing Alice’s bank account information, while the
cloudlet delimits a digital area containing a set of provi-
sioned VMs. Proximity relationships indicate if two digital
objects are placed in the same area (e.g., if two VMs are
hosted on the same machine). Unlike in physical topologies,
reachability relationships are also realised through commu-
nication links. For example, Alice’s information can reach a
cloudlet’s VM associated with Alice (e.g., VM-1) because of
the logical communication link between Alice’s mobile
device and VM-1. Although they are not shown in Fig. 1 for
reasons of clarity, network connections also exist between
the gateway and the various digital devices, including ones
belonging to the BAS (e.g., HVAC, CCTVs and lights).
Topological properties of a physical space can enable exe-
cution of actions in the cyber space. For example, the physical
location of an agent carrying a mobile device in the wifi area
allows her to connect to the wireless network and allocate a
VM. Similarly, topological properties of the cyber space can
enable execution of actions in the physical space. For exam-
ple, connection of a digital device to the local network con-
trolling BAS appliances allows sending commands to
physical appliances (e.g., the HVAC) connected to the same
network, possibly changing their behaviour.
The approach described in this paper aims at supporting
the design of secure cyber-physical spaces. The designer
can provide topological descriptions as well as specification
of security requirements with respect to security goals (con-
fidentiality, integrity, availability—CIA [11]). The following
security requirements aim to protect digital (SR1 and SR2)
and physical (SR3 and SR4) assets and operationalise such
CIA security goals.
 Availability of cloudlet services to connected customers: if a
customer is connected to the wireless network, then at
least one the following statements must be valid: i) the
customer has at least one VM allocated to her, ii) the
cloudlet has not reached itsmaximum capacity (SR1).
 Confidentiality of customers’ information: information
transmitted by a bank customer to the cloudlet
should never be received by other customers (SR2).
 Integrity of the safe: agents should always be accom-
panied by a security guard when they are in the safe
room (SR3).
 Integrity of the appliances: appliances comprising the
BAS should never execute commands originating
from untrusted connected agents (SR4).
2.2 Adaptive Security in Cyber-Physical Systems
Different threats can arise dynamically when changes take
place in the cyber or physical space. In this paper a security
threat is conceived as a violation of a security goal [12].
Cyber threats can arise from changes in the cyber space and
may cause harm to a digital asset. For example, if the cloudlet
has reached its maximum capacity and Eve connects to the
wireless network, the cloudlet service availability (SR1) can be
violated since Eve’s requests cannot be met. A security policy
to counter this threat could enforce deallocation of a VM asso-
ciatedwith another agent, or could oblige another agent or Eve
to disconnect from thewireless network or leave thewifi area.
Physically-enabled cyber threats can arise from changes in
the physical space and may cause harm to a digital asset.
For example, assuming that Eve is in the main area, if she
moves to the wifi area, she could connect to the wireless net-
work and eavesdrop confidential information transmitted
between Alice and the cloudlet, violating SR2. A security
policy to counter this threat could prohibit unencrypted
communications between customers and the cloudlet at the
cost of increasing mobile device battery consumption, or
could prohibit Eve from connecting to the wireless network.
Physical threats can arise from changes in the physical
space and may harm a physical asset. For example, Mallory
is an external visitor who is initially co-located with the
security guard in the corridor. If she enters the safe room
while the security guard remains in the corridor, the integ-
rity of the safe could be violated. A security policy to
counter this threat could oblige the security guard to move
to the safe room to perform surveillance, or could prohibit
Mallory from entering it.
Cyber-enabled physical threats can arise from changes in the
digital space that can harm a physical asset, for example by
subverting the functioning of appliances comprising the
BAS which control heating, ventilation and lighting and
perform surveillance. Note that protocols used in BAS (e.g.,
KNX [13]) do not include security features, because of lim-
ited resources or legacy deployments. Therefore, passwords
employed to authenticate valid commands are sent in clear-
text on the network, thus allowing key sniffing [14] and the
possibility of actively subverting the correct functioning of
appliances. In our example, to guarantee the integrity of the
server, it is necessary to ensure the correct functioning of
the HVAC located in the server room. To achieve this aim a
security policy should prohibit execution by the HVAC of
malicious commands originating from untrusted agents.
To support such adaptive security scenarios, the app-
roach we advocate here consists of (1) monitoring topologi-
cal changes in the operational environment, (2) identifying
possible requirements violations that can arise from future
topological configurations that may be entered by the CPSp,
and (3) planning and enacting security policies that counter
such possible violations.
3 TOPOLOGY AWARE ADAPTIVE SECURITY
Fig. 2 provides an overview of our topology aware adaptive
security approach. Adaptation builds on a live representation
of the topology of the CPSp characterising a system opera-
tional environment modelled using BRS [9]. Adaptive secu-
rity is achieved by implementing the activities of the
Monitoring, Analysis, Planning, Execution (MAPE) loop [15].
Analysis and Planning are responsible for identifying possi-
ble security requirements violations and generating an adap-
tation strategy, respectively. Monitoring and Execution are
responsible for enacting it at runtime.
During monitoring, events generated in the CPSp indicat-
ing the execution of agents’ actions are received. For our
example, such events can indicate access to a room by an
agent, connection/disconnection of a mobile device to/
from the wireless network, provisioning/deprovisioning of
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VMs on the cloudlet, and message exchanges between a
mobile device and a VM. The model of the space main-
tained at runtime is also updated accordingly.
During speculative threat analysis, future topological con-
figurations of the space representing violations of security
requirements which can arise when agents perform actions
are identified through model checking. The component per-
forming analysis receives as input the model of the CPSp
and the security requirements. Analysis identifies configu-
rations where violations of security requirements take place,
as well as additional neighbouring configurations of the
CPSp before and after a violation.
During planning, an adaptation strategy that aims to coun-
teract future violations of security requirements is generated.
It consists of a set of security policies to be enacted at specific
configurations of the CPSp. In this paper, a security policy can
prohibit execution of actions leading to the violation of a secu-
rity requirement, or could oblige (enforce) execution of actions
to circumvent or mitigate a violation. This activity receives as
input from the analysis configurationswhere security require-
ments are violated as well as their corresponding neighboring
configurations. For each violation, it identifies a security
policy if one exists, or prompts for a change in the design of
the control system if the violation cannot be handled.
During execution, the adaptation strategy is enacted on
the system. This activity receives as input the current config-
uration of the CPSp from the monitoring activity, and iden-
tifies if a specific state in the adaptation strategy is reached.
If that is the case, it enacts specific security policies indi-
cated in the adaptation strategy.
In this paper we focus on two critical activities of the
MAPE loop: analysis and planning. We assume adequate
monitoring is in place, as well as an execution environ-
ment through which selected adaptation strategies are
enacted.
4 MODELLING CYBER AND PHYSICAL SPACES
A modelling formalism for the topology of CPSp should
allow the representation of the structure of those spaces and
communication or linking among entities and agents. It
should also enable reasoning about the effects of topological
changes arising from (potentially concurrent) execution of
actions by digital and physical agents. Process calculi are
well established mathematical languages with well defined
semantics that allow reasoning about properties of concur-
rent systems. They are essentially models of processes or
agents interacting with each other and their environment.
Several process calculi have been proposed, such as the
p-calculus [16], focusing on process migration, interaction
and communication via dynamic channels, and assuming a
flat process structure, or the Ambient Calculus [8], assum-
ing a hierarchical process structure. However, such formal-
isms are not supportive of mechanisms to reason about
topological characteristics of CPSp affected by both struc-
ture of the space as well as by links.
Bigraphs [9] are an emerging formalism for structures in
ubiquitous computing. They consider both linking and
structure. Bigraphical Reactive Systems extend bigraphs
with well defined semantics of dynamic behaviour expre-
ssed as a set of reaction rules. These rules allow reasoning
about possible future topological configurations of the
CPSp that are reachable from the current one, yielding a
branching structure. In this section, we introduce bigraphs
and BRS and explain how we have used them to model
CPSp, their dynamics, and how requirements are specified.
4.1 Bigraphs and BRS
Bigraphs consist of two graphs. A place graph is a forest, a set
of rooted trees defined over a set of nodes. A link graph is a
hypergraph composed of the same set of nodes of the place
graph and a set of edges each linking any number of nodes;
this graph represents generic many-to-many relationships
among nodes. Connections of an edge with its nodes are
called ports. Place and link graphs are orthogonal, and edges
between nodes can cross locality boundaries. Bigraphs allow
us to express topological characteristics of CPSp; the place
graph defines a hierarchical structure, which can model
topological properties like containment, while the link graph
can represent communication or some linking among nodes.
What follows is a rather informal presentation of bigraphs as
used in the scope of this paper; the interested reader can refer
to the work byMilner [9] for complete definitions and proofs
of the bigraphical theory.
Bigraphs can be described in algebraic terms (Formulae
(1a), (1b), (1c), (1d), and (1e)); in Section 4.2 we introduce an
equivalent rigorous graphical representation. P , Q, and U
are controls of bigraph nodes; controls are names that
define a node’s type. Nodes can be structured hierarchi-
cally through the containment relationship, expressed in
Formula 1a. Two nodes may be placed at the same hierar-
chical structure level, as shown in Formula 1b. Additionally,
bigraphs can contain sites, a special type of node (Formula
(1c)) that can be used to denote a placeholder; sites can be
used to indicate presence of unspecified nodes. Each node
control can be associated with a number of named ports. If
a single instance node of a given type exists in the bigraph,
the control uniquely identifies that node. Otherwise, we
use a port name as a way to uniquely identify it. In
Formula (1d) the node identified by control K and port
names in list w also contains U . Ports that appear in a
formula with the same name are connected, forming a
Fig. 2. Our topology aware adaptive security approach.
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hyper-edge, called link in the sequel. In Formula 1e, W and
R indicate different roots.
P:Q Nesting ðP contains QÞ (1a)
P j Q Juxtaposition of nodes (1b)
i Site numbered i (1c)
Kw:ðUÞ Node with control K
having ports with names
in w: K contains U
(1d)
W k R Juxtaposition of bigraphs: (1e)
BRS support specification of dynamic behaviour by extend-
ing bigraphs with reaction rules defining possible reconfigu-
rations. Reaction rules are parametric and specify how a
bigraph can be modified by rewriting selectively some of its
portions. Reaction rules have the general form of R! R0,
where R is a redex and R0 is a reactum; both the redex and
reactum are bigraphs. In particular, if a part of a bigraph
that matches the redex is identified, it can be replaced with
the reactum, in a fashion similar to graph rewriting. The use
of reaction rules is illustrated informally in the next section
through examples.
4.2 BRS to Model Cyber and Physical Spaces
The notions of node nesting (containment) and linking of
bigraphs, can be used to model different aspects of a CPSp
in a unifying way. The semantic association between these
bigraph notions and the real-world phenomena they repre-
sent is not stated explicitly. We assume it is recorded sepa-
rately as part of the model documentation.
Containment defines a hierarchical node structure, which
can represent nesting of entities, like an agent residing in a
room, or reachability relationships such as a room being phys-
ically reachable from another through a door. Additionally, it
can be used to model a role held by some entity, by nesting a
node representing a role in it. For example, the main room in
Fig. 1 can be modelled by a node that contains a node repre-
senting thewifi area; this indicates reachability of thewifi area
from the main room. Likewise, the corridor node contains a
node representing agent Mallory. Containment can also
indicate the boundary within which an entity resides (e.g., a
node representing Alice’s digital information can be nested
within a node representing her mobile device, to indicate the
physical boundarywithinwhich the information resides).
Bigraph links are defined by associating nodes to specific
port names; for CPSp modelling, this can be utilised in two
ways: identifying instances of nodes, or representing some
semantic relationship (e.g., connectivity) among nodes, by
linking them to the same port name. We partition the set of
port names by some criteria recorded as part of the domain
model; e.g., set A for names of agents and set R for names
of rooms.
Fig. 3a shows a graphical representation of a bigraph con-
figuration partially modelling the CPSp of our example.
Agent and Room are examples of node controls signifying a
node type. Containment is represented graphically by nest-
ing a node inside another. Room with name corridor, con-
tains Agents with names mallory and trudy, as well as
another Room (the safe room). A token node Visitor is con-
tained in Agent with name mallory, signifying that she is a
visitor; similarly with the security guard. Sites (graphically
represented by shaded boxes) denote the presence of other,
unspecified nodes. For example, the fact that the Room
named corridor also contains other entities besides the two
agents and the safe room, is collectively represented by a site
placeholder (6). By linking controls to names, ports are used
to identify instances of controls (e.g.,mallory and saferoom);
they are represented graphically as black bullets. Ports can
also be linked together to form named edges; for example,
edge lan between AP (access point) and Cloudlet represents
connectivity between them. Finally, the dotted outer box
graphically represents the root. Using the algebraic notation,
the same bigraph of Fig. 3a can be represented as follows:
Roommain:

Roomwifiarea:ðAPlan j 0Þ
 Roomcorridor:
Agentmallory:ðVisitor j 1Þ
 Agenttrudy:ðGuard j 2Þ
j 6
 Roomsaferoom:ðSafej3Þ  Roomsrvroom:
ðCloudletlan:ð4Þ
5Þ

:
(2)
BRS and CPSp Dynamics. Reaction rules allow us to model
the actions, whose occurrence in the real world cause the evo-
lution of the CPSp over time. The following example models
the configuration change due to an agent entering a room
with which she is at the same hierarchical level. Sites in the
redex can represent the matching of arbitrary nodes present
in a specific part of a bigraph. In the reactum, nodes belong-
ing to the matched subgraph will be placed in the positions
of the corresponding sites, identified by the same number.
Awareness of which entities are involved in actions executed
in the CPSp must be reflected in a reaction specification.
Fig. 3. Bigraph configuration before (a) and after (b) a reaction is applied, leading to integrity violation SR3 (c).
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Moreover, the reaction rule must be expressed in a paramet-
ric way, to account for arbitrary agents and rooms. Thus, we
specify along with the reaction, variables ranging over sets of
port names that indicate the enactor entity (an agent in A)
along with other subject entities involved in the changes
modelled by the reaction (a room in R). Use of variables is
not strictly part of bigraphs, but was also proposed by [17].

n 2 A; r 2 RAgentn:0 j Roomr:1 j 2 !
Roomr:ðAgentn:0 j 1Þ j 2 :
(3)
Formula (3) and Fig. 4 show an enter room reaction, where
Agent nmoves into Room r, while all the other elements con-
tained either in theAgent n (signified by site0), around (site
2) or in the adjacentRoom r (site1) are not modified. In the
enter room reaction, port n corresponds to the name of the
agent, and port r corresponds to the room involved in the
reaction. Note that the enter room reaction can be applied to
the configuration of Fig. 3a (Formula (2)), where agent named
mallory is at the same hierarchical level with the room named
saferoom. After the application of the reaction, she is then
contained in it, resulting in the configuration of Fig. 3b.
Besides entering or exiting rooms, other reactions can be
specified to model various actions that can be performed in
the system. For example, bank customers can connect to the
wireless network when they are located in the wifi area
(connect wifi). They can also use the bank financial services
through their mobile device, which must be connected to
the wireless network; a new service request can cause the
provisioning of a new VM on the cloudlet (create vm).
Moreover, customers can transmit information tokens either
in an unencrypted (tx) or encrypted (tx enc) way. Given a
bigraph that describes the initial configuration, the system
evolves by applying reaction rules, which model the occur-
rence of possible actions, generating new configurations. At
each step, several applications of reaction rules may be pos-
sible, thus branching off possible new configurations.
4.3 Specifying Security Requirements for CPSp
A property for a given configuration can also be expressed by
a bigraph. A configuration described by a bigraph C satisfies
a property if the bigraph specifying the property can be
matched against C, exactly in the same way a redex is
matched against a bigraph to apply a reaction. Failure of
matching the bigraph representing a property against C,
means instead that the property is not satisfied. The utilisa-
tion of sites in the bigraph specifying the property that is
checked againstC indicates that the portion ofC thatmatches
a site does not affect the property. To specify properties, we
can quantify over the sets of port names which have been
defined previously, e.g., for agentsA. We use the wildcard ‘?’
to denote any port name. For example, an undesired configu-
ration corresponding to the violation of the safe’s integrity is
represented in Fig. 3c (and, equivalently, Formula (4a)), indi-
cating a visitorAgent co-locatedwith a Safe in aRoom.
SR3a : Room?:

Safe
 Agenty:ðVisitor j 0Þ  1 
: 8y 2 A: (4a)
The configuration of Fig. 3c (Formula (4a)) matches the
bigraph of Fig. 3b. In the same fashion, we can specify an
acceptable configuration where a Safe is co-located with a
Visitor agent and a security Guard agent (Formula (5a)).
SR3b : Safe
 Agent?:ðVisitor j 0Þ  Agent?:ðGuard j 1Þ: (5a)
Having defined how to specify a property for a configu-
ration, we can now show how system requirements can be
specified. This is done by predicating on the branching
structure induced by reaction rules utilising branching time
temporal logic (CTL [18]). CTL includes two types of formu-
lae: state and path formulae. State formulae are defined
using the grammar specified in Formula (6), where ’ is a
path formula. Propositions a are expressed as bigraphs.
Thus a state formula can be a bigraph configuration, the
special proposition true, the composition (^) of two sub-for-
mulae, the negation (:) of a formula, and a path CTL for-
mula prefixed by E (exists) or A (always) path quantifiers. E
predicates that ’ must hold on at least one path starting
from the current state, while A asserts that ’ must hold on
all paths starting from the current state.
F ::¼ true j a jF1 ^F2 j :F j E’ j A’: (6)
CTL path formulae are defined in Equation (7). A state
CTL formula F prefixed by the next operator (X), and two
CTL formulae F1 and F2 linked by the until operator (U) are
valid CTL path formulae.
’ ::¼ X F jF1U F2: (7)
Path formulae are interpreted over paths of the branch-
ing structure. For example, given a path p, the property
F1U F2 is true if there exists a state s in the path that satisfies
F2 and each state that precedes s on the path satisfies F2.
Additional operators may be derived from the basic ones –
AGf  :E true Uð:fÞ expresses global satisfaction of f on all
paths. Formulae 8a and 8b specify bigraphs SR1 and SR2,
respectively, formalising configurations violating require-
ments SR1 and SR2.
SR1 : Agentz:ðPhonewlan j 0Þ ^ :VMz
^ Cloudletlan:ðVM? j VM? j VM? j VM?Þ : 8z 2 A
(8a)
SR2 : Agentz:

Phonewlan:ðInfoyÞ j 0

: 8z; y 2 A; z 6¼ y: (8b)
For example, SR1 expresses the case in which an agent
named z is connected to the network (Agentz:
ðPhonewlan j 0Þ), no VM is allocated to her (:VMz), and the
cloudlet has reached its hardcoded maximum capacity
(Cloudletlan:ðVM? j VM? j VM? j VM?Þ). In Formula (9), a
global system requirement is described; in every possible
Fig. 4. (a) redex, and (b) reactum of the enter room reaction.
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evolution of the initial configuration, requirements SR1-SR3
are never violated.
AGð:SR1 ^ :SR2 ^ :ðSR3a ^ :SR3bÞÞ: (9)
5 SPECULATIVE THREAT ANALYSIS
Speculative threat analysis aims to identify potential viola-
tions of security requirements that can take place in future
evolutions of the CPSp. To support it, we need to explore the
state space of possible configurations that can be generated
from an initial topological configuration. In this section we
first illustrate how such a state space can be generated from a
BRS specification and formally represented as a state
machine, where states represent configurations and transi-
tions represent actions occurring in the environment that
generate new configurations. We then discuss how the state
space can be explored to check whether future configura-
tions that violate the requirements can be reached.
Formally, the state machine we generate from the BRS
specification to enable automated reasoning is a (Doubly)
Labelled Transition System [18] (LTS) L, defined as a tuple
hS; i;L; AP;!; Li, where:
 S is a set of states describing configurations;
 i 2 S is the initial state;
 L is a set of transition labels;
 AP is a set of atomic propositions;
 ! S  L S is a 3-adic relation of labelled transi-
tions. If p; q 2 S and a 2 L, then ðp;a; qÞ 2! is writ-
ten as p!a q .
 L : S ! 2AP is a function that labels each state with
the set of propositions that are true in that state.
A BRS specification can be interpreted as an equivalent
LTS, which models the evolution of topological configura-
tions caused by the occurrence of actions, modelled by reac-
tions. Intuitively, given an initial configuration specified by
a bigraph and a set of reaction rules, a target LTS can be
generated by mapping bigraph configurations to states and
the firing of reaction rules to transitions. The set of (AP )
propositions that label a state (e.g., p 2 S) can be systemati-
cally generated by declaratively encoding the correspond-
ing bigraph configuration. LTS transition labels instead
must indicate a specific instantiation of a reaction rule. To
understand how new configurations are systematically gen-
erated and how the corresponding LTS transitions are
labelled, consider an initial configuration specified by For-
mula (10), which represents two Agents (a and b) outside
Rooms (p and k, respectively). The enter room reaction (For-
mula (3)) can be applied to this initial configuration leading
to two possible ones, describing either Agenta or Agentb
entering Roomp and Roomk, respectively.
Agenta:0 j Roomp:ðAgentb:1 j Roomk:2Þ: (10)
When matching a reaction redex, the portion of a config-
uration that the redex matches indicates the specific bigraph
nodes that instantiated the redex, including their named
ports. Since ports are also used to indicate specific instances
of node controls, each match can be distinguished by the
ports of those nodes that matched the redex. Therefore, the
transitions that lead to the states labelled with new
configurations are labelled according to the reaction applied
(enter room) as well as the named ports of controls of the
initial configuration that instantiated the redex and appear
in the involved entities specification of the reaction (in this
case agents A and rooms R). Thus, one transition will refer
to fa; pg and the other to fb; kg, indicating that Agenta
entered Roomp or Agentb entered Roomk, respectively.
Formulae 11a-11b show the labels as well as the correspond-
ing configurations generated. Matching can be automated
by configuring existing approaches for BRS (i.e., [19], [20]).
hfa; pg; enter roomi
Roomp:ðAgenta:0 j Agentb:1 j Roomk:2Þ
(11a)
hfb; kg; enter roomi
Agenta:0 j Roomp:ðRoomk:ðAgentb:1 j 2ÞÞ:
(11b)
As the combination of a reaction name and associated
ports identifying involved entities is unique since they cor-
respond to actions in the CPSp, the derived LTS is determin-
istic, i.e., for every state p and transition label a, there is at
most one state q such that p!a q. Formulae (11a) and (11b)
show such generated labels along with new configurations
that will be encoded in AP propositions in states.
The process of generating configurations and labelling
states and transitions must be iterated by exploring all con-
figurations. Whenever a reaction rule is applied to a config-
uration, a new LTS state is generated if no state already
exists in the LTS that is labelled by the same configuration.
This can continue until no new state can be generated,
which corresponds to the case where the set of possible con-
figurations is finite.
An exhaustive generation and analysis of all LTS states
may not always be possible or may be inconvenient. The
state space generated by the BRS can in fact be infinite, as for
example in the casewhere allocation of newvirtualmachines
in the cloudlet (create vm) is always possible. In other cases,
although in theory the exhaustive exploration of the state
space leads to a finite number of states, performance con-
straints may not allow generating or maintaining the full
LTS, as it can grow to a size that causes memory or analysis
performance issues. In addition, possible changes to the
CPSp and hence to the BRSmodel would require performing
again the entire (costly) LTS interpretation. Examples of such
changes can be partitioning a physical area to create two sep-
arate rooms or extending the maximum number of virtual
machines that can be created beyond the limit initially speci-
fied in the BRS. In all above cases, state generation terminates
when it reaches a predefined lookahead horizon, which cor-
responds to the exhaustive exploration of a certain number
of subsequent actions. Overall, partial LTS generation aims
to address scalability. Although a high lookahead horizon
(even up to achievement of full LTS generation) allows in-
depth exploration of the potential evolution of the CPSp con-
figurations, it incurs increased space and time overhead. For
this reason, it might bemore suitable for design time analysis
and for operational environments that rarely change.
Fig. 5 shows an LTS fragment corresponding to the evolu-
tion of the example presented in Section 2. State a represents
the initial configuration of Fig. 1, where Alice is in the wifi
area and her mobile device is connected to the wireless
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network. Eve is also located in the wifi area but her mobile
device is not connected. From this state, Eve can connect to
the network (hfeveg; connect wifii), or perhaps Alice can
issue a new financial service request to the cloudlet causing
the creation of a new VM (hfaliceg; create vmi). In state b
Alice can transmit her personal information to one of
her VMs hosted in the cloudlet (hfaliceg; txi) or can dismiss
one of the financial services requested causing the deletion
of one of the VMs allocated on her behalf (hfalice; vm2g;
delete vmi). In state aMallory and Trudy are in the corridor
and, for example, Mallory can access the safe room
(hfmallory; saferoomg; enter roomi).
To identify threats in future evolutions of the initial con-
figuration (i.e., initial state of L), we consider elementary
bigraphical predicates as atomic propositions in a CTL
logic, which is interpreted over the states and branching
paths of the transition system. In both modes—full or par-
tial BRS interpretation—by ignoring transition labels and
only considering state labels, the security requirements
specification is verified against the LTS, discovering possi-
ble states that represent violations using standard CTL
verification techniques, for which on the fly checking is also
possible [21]. In Fig. 5 for example, security requirement
SR2 is violated in state f since information transmitted
by Alice can reach Eve’s mobile device. Similarly, if Mallory
leaves the corridor and accesses the safe room, security
requirement SR3 is violated (state c) since Mallory is co-
located with the safe and without being accompanied by
the security guard (Trudy).
6 PLANNING
The CPS can be viewed as a system composed of two enti-
ties: the environment, in which autonomous agents live and
events occur, and the controller—the object of our design.
This is a two-players game, where the environment is an
opponent that may lead to unsafe states where require-
ments are violated, while the controller tries to counteract
by devising a strategy able to prevent, circumvent, or miti-
gate such violations. The goal of planning is to compute an
adaptation strategy to counteract potential threats, utilising
violating states identified through analysis as well as infor-
mation recorded on the transition labels of the LTS. If the
full LTS model is available, planning can be performed at
design time and then enacted at runtime. However, if the
LTS model is generated and analysed at runtime as dis-
cussed earlier, planning also has to be performed at run-
time, whenever possible threats are detected.
6.1 Adaptation Strategy Computation
To identify an adaptation strategy it is necessary to distin-
guish actions originating in the operational environment
from those originating in the controller. Environment actions
can be generally partitioned in two classes: uncontrollable (U)
and controllable. Uncontrollable actions are those whose
occurrence is out of the system’s control. For example, the
action of a person entering a room is uncontrollable if, for
example, the door cannot be locked. Because such actions
may lead to security violations, we can only attempt to miti-
gate their effect after they occur. Controllable actions can be
classified as enforceable (E), preventable (P), or both (E+P). We
assume that all environment actions are specified by stating
their class (U, E, P, or E+P). An action is enforceable by the
controller if the controller can enforce its execution. For
example, action hfalice; vm2g; delete vmi can be enforced by
instructing the cloudlet to deallocate VM2. An action is pre-
ventable if its occurrence can be prohibited by the controller.
For example, action ðhfaliceg; create vmiÞ can be prevented
by the controller by prohibiting VM allocations by Alice. We
assume that prohibiting or enforcing an action by the control-
ler takes precedence over any other action performed by the
environment and has an associated cost.
To express security policies, consider an LTS L ¼ hS; i;
L; AP;!; Li and V as the set of violating states found dur-
ing threat analysis. An adaptation strategy identifies secu-
rity policies to be enacted at specific LTS states representing
configurations that lead to security requirements violations.
We call these alarm states; a state is considered to be an
alarm state if it is not a violating state and it leads to a violat-
ing state. Although our approach may consider alarm states
at any distance from violating states, for simplicity hereafter
we assume a distance of one; that is, alarm states are con-
nected by a transition to a violating state.
Whenever an alarm state is entered, the controller enacts
a security policy by either (a) prohibiting actions that would
lead to a violating state, or (b) pre-emptively enforcing an
action that would correspond to exiting the alarm state and
entering a safe (non-violating) state, thus circumventing the
violation. If none of these security policies can be enacted,
the environment may bring the system into a violating state.
In such a case, the controller tries to enact a security policy
that mitigates the violation, by enforcing actions that can
bring the CPSp into a safe state. Because of the assumption
on the priority of action enforcement over other environ-
ment actions, the sequence of actions that brings the CPSp
to a safe state after entering a violating state can be consid-
ered as an atomic compound action.
Each security policy is specified as a set of security
rules according to the OrBAC model [22]; is
prohibitedð=is obligedÞhs;a; oi indicates that subject s is
prohibited (resp. enforced) to perform action a on object o.
Observe that we can deconstruct every transition label
g 2 L to its constituents hs;a; oi where a is the name of the
action associated with g, s is the enacting entity, and o is the
entity—if any—upon which the action is performed. For
example, label hftrudy; saferoomg; enter roomi refers to
subject trudy, action enter room and object saferoom. There-
fore, to simplify notation in the following we will refer to
OrBAC terms is prohibited=is obliged as operating on
transition labels (or sequences of labels). We distinguish
Fig. 5. LTS fragment (violating states are in dark).
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between three types of security policies; for each alarm state
an optimal security policy is chosen, if any. In the remainder
of this section we formalise and exemplify security policies.
A prevent security policy (P) aims at prohibiting the occur-
rence of all actions that would lead to violating states from
an alarm state (a). This policy can be selected if all transi-
tions (g) exiting a and entering a violating state are of class
P (or E þ P ). Let P be the set of all transitions exiting from
a and entering a violating state. Formally, the prevent secu-
rity policy P associated with the alarm state is defined as
follows:
PðaÞ : fis prohibitedðgÞ j 8s0 : a!g s0; g 2 P; s0 2 V g:
The cost of the prevent policy is the cumulative cost of
prohibiting the actions associated with the transitions in P:
costðPÞ ¼Pðcostðfg j g 2 PgÞ. Conventionally, we assume
P ¼ ; and costðPÞ ¼ 1 if the prevent security policy cannot
be enacted in the alarm state.
A circumvent security policy (C) aims at circumventing vio-
lating states from an alarm state (a), by enforcing the execu-
tion of an action entering a safe state, if one exists. This
policy can be devised by first computing the set of all transi-
tions of class E (or E þ P ) exiting a and entering a safe state
and then selecting among those the transition g—if one
exists—whose enforcement has minimum cost. The circum-
vent security policy C associated with the alarm state a is
defined as the set that contains only one element
is obligedðgÞ; formally:
CðaÞ : fis obligedðgÞ j 9s0 : a!g s0; g 2 E; s0 =2 V g:
We define costðCÞ as the cost of enforcing the occurrence of
the action associated with g. Conventionally, we assume
costðCÞ ¼ 1 if the circumvent security policy is not possible
(i.e., no transition g exiting an alarm state and entering a
safe state can be found).
Amitigation security policy (M) aims at mitigating security
requirement violations determined by the execution of an
action that cannot be prevented by the controller. Intui-
tively, as an alarm state is entered a mitigation strategy first
prohibits all actions corresponding to transitions that lead
to violating states and are labelled as P (or E þ P ), if any.
Then, if an uncontrollable action occurs that causes the sys-
tem entering a violating state, the execution of a sequence of
actions leading to a safe state is enforced. To formalise this
security policy it is first necessary to introduce the following
definitions. Given that si 2 S; 0  i  n and ai 2 L, a finite
computation is defined as a finite composition of transitions:
s0
a1  ::  an						! sn ¼def s0 !a1 s1 !a2 ::: sn1 !an sn:
The concatenation a1  a2  . . .  an of labels (representing
actions) is called a trace originating from s0. The sequence of
states s1  . . .  sn1 is called the sequence of traversed states.
State s0 is called the originating state of the sequence and
state sn is called the end state.
Let a be an alarm state and v a violating state reachable
from a by a transition a!g v, where g is a non preventable
action. Let EM be the set of all traces such that (1) v is the
originating state, (2) all transitions in the trace are labelled
by actions of class E (or E þ P ), (3) all traversed states are
violating states, and (4) the end state is safe (i.e., non-violat-
ing). This set is called the set of enforceable mitigating (EM)
recovery traces associated with g:
EMgðvÞ : fs j v!s vn; s 2 Eþ; v  . . .  vn1 2 V; vn =2 V g:
Among all EMg traces, we can choose the sequence of
enforceable actions of minimum cost. This is performed for
all non preventable transitions from the alarm state to vio-
lating states. In summary, a mitigating security policyM is
formally defined as a pair of sets hB;Ki. B is a set of ele-
ments is prohibitedðaÞ, where a are all the transitions exit-
ing the alarm state and entering a violating state that are
preventable. K is a set of pairs fx; tg, where t is a sequence
of is obligedðb1Þ . . . is obligedðbnÞ elements correspond-
ing to the (minimum cost) EM trace (b1  . . .  bn) preceded
by transition g whose corresponding action is x. Formally,
the second constituent ofM associated with an alarm state a
is defined as follows:
KðaÞ : fhg; is obligedðEMgðvÞÞi j a!g v; v 2 V g:
If no enforceable mitigating recovery traces can be found for
each of the reachable violating states, no mitigating security
policy exists for an alarm state. The expected maximum cost
ofM is the cumulative cost of B plus the maximum cost of
the sequences of enforceable actions t associated with the
violating states that may be entered.
Consider the example previously presented where Mal-
lory is located in the corridor; a fragment of the LTS gener-
ated is shown in Fig. 5. The system is in alarm state (a) and
a requirement violation occurs if Mallory enters the safe
room (state c). Suppose that the system is unable to control
access to the safe room; it cannot forbid entering nor can it
physically force Mallory to exit (U actions). However, it
may be able to instruct the security guard to move inside
the room to perform surveillance. In this case, a security
policy will include rule is obligedhtrudy; enter room;
safe roomi. The adaptation strategy computed also includes
prohibiting unencrypted transmissions when both Alice
and Eve are connected to the wireless network (states e and
g), as this is a preventable action and a circumvent or miti-
gation security policy is not applicable. The resulting strat-
egy consists of the security policies to be enacted at alarm
states e, g and a; they are shown as annotated dotted transi-
tions in Fig. 5. In some cases planning can be unsuccessful,
i.e., plans for violations in a given analysed alarm state do
not exist and a model redesign is needed. For example, if
the guard trudy is absent (recall that hfmallory; saferoomg;
enter roomi is a U action), the CPSp will reach a violating
state with no mitigating security policy to be enacted.
6.2 Adaptation Strategy Enactment
Monitoring and Execution are responsible for enacting an
adaptation strategy at runtime through a controller mecha-
nism [23]. During Monitoring, the events taking place in the
operational environment are detected. Such events indicate
the execution of actions represented as reaction rules in the
BRS, and correspond to LTS transitions, which is main-
tained as a live model at runtime. Whenever an action is
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performed, the live model is updated reflecting the new
state reached by the operational environment. If the new
state entered is an alarm state, the corresponding security
policy is enacted by Execution as a high-priority atomic
activity, as stated in the adaptation strategy. We assume
policies are enacted in a time interval that is less than the
change rate of the environment, which is in turn related to
its inertia; to satisfy this assumption we place the controller
as an intermediary between the CPSp and the system.
Prevent or circumvent security policies will be priori-
tized; if these do not exist, mitigation security policies are
enacted. If more that one option is viable, the one with mini-
mum cost is chosen. If none is available, then the current
design inevitably leads to a security requirement violation
and must be revised. Called upon an alarm state a, Algo-
rithm 1 checks if prevent or circumvent security policies
have been identified. If such policies exist, the one with min-
imum cost is enacted, prohibiting or enforcing actions as
prescribed in the selected policy. Should none exist, the con-
troller enacts a mitigating security policy by prohibiting
actions prescribed in B, if any. Subsequently, it will block
until a new event is received from the environment. If the
received event represents the execution of an action x lead-
ing to a violating state, the controller will enact the rules
enforcing the actions associated with sequence t.
Algorithm 1.Monitoring & Execution
1: function EXECa;Pa;Ca;Ma
2: ifPa 6¼ ; or Ca is defined then
3: if costðPaÞ  costðCaÞ then ENACT ðPaÞ
4: else ENACT ðCaÞ
5: end if; return
6: end if
7: Ma : hB;Ki ; ENACT ðBÞ
8: fx; tg 2 K: kblock until x occurs in the environmentk
9: t: henforcement plan for x 2 Ki ; ENACT ðtÞ
10: end function
As we observed, in certain cases due to performance con-
straints, analysis is unable to perform an exhaustive explora-
tion of all possible configurations of the CPSp, and only
covers a maximum number of subsequent system states up
to a predefined lookahead horizon. In this case, as execution
progresses, it may be necessary to extend the explored por-
tion of the state space by updating the LTSmodel at runtime.
Subsequently, analysis for possible violations is performed
again, alongwith the security policy computation.
7 EVALUATION
To support our approach and assess its effectiveness, we real-
ised a prototype tool;2 its functionalities were showcased [24]
by implementing a test-bed instantiating a cyber-physical sys-
tem similar to the example presented in Section 2.
To use our approach in practice, a security engineer has to
specify the initial model of the CPSp, its dynamics in the
form of reaction rules and security requirements using the
bigraphical notation previously presented. Reaction rules
corresponding to actions that can be performed by agents in
the CPS are classified as P , E, E þ P , or U . In the first three
cases, the security engineer also estimates the cost of prohib-
iting or enforcing the action. In the example, actions include
entering/exiting rooms, connecting and disconnecting digi-
tal devices, transmitting information, allocating VMs, as well
as printing, opening and closing documents. Additionally,
switching on and off appliances, such as lights and HVACs.
The tool verifies satisfaction of security requirements. If vio-
lating states are found, it computes adaptation strategies for
the corresponding alarm states, and prompts for a redesign
if no security policies can be found. At runtime, adaptation
strategies are enacted when alarm states are entered. In the
rest of the section we assess the applicability of our approach
by extending the example of Section 2 to formalise SR4 and
consider three additional requirements (SR5-SR7), that we
have formulated following discussions with an industrial
partner working on access control. Finally, we assess space
and time overhead necessary to generate an adaptation strat-
egy and discuss results obtained.
7.1 Applicability and Overhead
Our evaluation scenarios, formulated after discussions with
an industrial partner, concern countering insider threats in a
CPSp. In the configuration presented in Section 2, insider
threats can be determined by agents exploiting their access
levels to cyber and physical assets. For instance, a reasonable
assumption is that connections to the network can be estab-
lished atwill, or that agents can physicallymove inside rooms
in a trusted environment. Security controls deployed to
counter such threats can be very complex as they must span
both spaceswhile not hindering overall system functionality.
Recall that the BAS should never execute commands
originating from untrusted agents (SR4). In particular, SR4
states that the HVAC should be prevented from executing
new commands until untrusted devices (e.g., Phone) carried
by visitors are disconnected from the network gateway
(Formula (12a)). In a first scenario, we assume that the trans-
mission of a potentially malicious packet (PktHvac) from a
connected device cannot be prohibited; indeed checking for
the packet’s source might not be satisfactory as this can be
spoofed by an attacker. Therefore, the gateway may be
enforced to conditionally discard packets received, until no
untrusted device is connected to the network.
SR4: AG

Agentx:ðVisitor j PhonewlanÞ
) A ð:Gateway:PktHvac U Agentx:
ðVisitor j PhoneÞÞ : 8x 2 A:
(12a)
In the second scenario, we assume that an employee is
working on a confidential document (Doc) on desktop D1
(Fig. 1). To guarantee the confidentiality of this document
two security requirements must be satisfied (SR5 and SR6).
SR5: AG
:ððAgentz:ðVisitor j 0Þ  Doc  1Þ
^ :ðAgenty:ðEmployee j 3Þ
 Doc  4ÞÞ
: 8z; y 2 A; z 6¼ y:
(13a)
SR6: AG

Prnt:Doc) A:ðAgentz:ðVisitor j1Þ
 Prnt:3Þ
U ðAgenty:ðEmployee j2Þ
 Prnt:4  DocÞ
: 8z; y 2 A; z 6¼ y:
(13b)
2. home.deib.polimi.it/tsigkanos/tdsc
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To prevent a malicious individual from exploiting his
permission to access Office 1 to see the document, SR5 states
that Doc must not be opened on D1 while another Agent
with role Visitor is in the office and an Employee is not pres-
ent. Note that when the document is opened, it is no longer
contained in a computer but it is considered at the same
hierarchical level of the agents and objects in a room. When
the document is opened, two security policies may be
enacted: i) prohibit access to the room, or when this is not
possible, ii) enforce closing the document when a visitor
enters the room. Similarly, SR6 states that the document
cannot be printed until an Employee is in the printer room.
When the document is spooled to the printer (Prnt) through
the network, the system chooses between two kinds of secu-
rity policies: i) prohibiting document printing until an
Employee is in the printer room or, ii) prohibiting Visitor
agents from entering the printer room until an Employee is
inside to collect the printout.
Similar to requirement SR3, consider a requirement
regarding the integrity of the assets placed in the server
room, such as the cloudlet (SR7). To guarantee their integ-
rity, it is necessary to ensure availability of the surveillance
facilities in the server room; this prevents an agent from
physically tampering with the equipment unnoticed. In par-
ticular, while an agent is in the server room alone, the
CCTV should be functioning and the light L1 should be
switched on, or alternatively a security guard should
already be inside. To satisfy this requirement, access may be
prohibited to the server room if the CCTV or the light are
not functioning. If the CCTV or the light stop working while
an agent is already inside the room, a security guard is
obliged to enter.
SR7: AG
:ð:ðCCTV ^ L1Þ
^ ðRoomsrvroom:ðAgent?:ðVisitor j 0Þ
 1Þ
^ :Roomsrvroom:ðAgent?:ðGuard j 2Þ
 3ÞÞ:
(14a)
We conducted our analysis on an Intel 3.5 GHz processor;
space and time overhead of the speculative analysis and
planning are indicated in Table 1. We compare the overhead
determined by analysing (identifying violations) and plan-
ning (computing adaptation strategies) for an LTS of increas-
ing lookahead horizons (e.g., 2, 4 and 6) with the one
determined by full interpretation. Results of Table 1 do not
include LTS generation. The execution time of analysis and
planning increase proportionally with the space overhead.
7.2 Discussion
We have demonstrated that BRS are a suitable formalism to
represent the topological properties of CPSp and reason
about their interplay. Moreover, by utilising CTL properties
over bigraph configurations as propositions, we were able to
encode and verify even complex security requirements (e.g.,
SR4-SR7) predicating on execution paths. Guaranteeing the
satisfaction of such requirements allows us to enforce fine
grained behaviour, such as conditional access depending on
past actions (e.g., for authentication purposes).
Our results highlight advantages and disadvantages
of generating the full evolution of the BRS model compared
to bounding analysis to a specific lookahead horizon.
Although the time to perform analysis when the state space
is not explored fully is lower (especially for a small look-
ahead), the adaptation strategy must be regenerated fre-
quently at runtime. Instead, although the time to perform
the analysis when the full model is adopted is higher, a new
adaptation strategy will be regenerated sporadically, only
when an exogenous change takes place, or at design time.
The reference implementation used is an experimental,
unoptimized prototype; state of the art tooling would reduce
overhead by several orders of magnitude. Moreover, strate-
gies reducing the number of reaction rules considered dur-
ing LTS generation could be investigated further. For
instance, correlating undesired configurations with domain-
specific information such as existing access control policies,
would allow to ignore states violating access control policies
during analysis. Another possibility is ignoring reaction
rules in the BRS model that do not have any impact on the
satisfaction of the security requirements. However, our pre-
liminary results do demonstrate the applicability of the
approach in its context, and encourage further investigation.
As with any model-based approach, guarantees of com-
pleteness are in the scope of the model specified by the secu-
rity engineer. Our approach does not take into account the
inertia of the system, i.e., the time necessary to execute an
action, which is especially relevant to physical systems. To
address this limitation, in future work we will encode met-
ric temporal characteristics into the underlying logical
framework used. This will enable the selection of a security
policy also depending on the time necessary to enact it. In
this paper security policies are assumed to be enacted as an
atomic action, occurring before the environment can change
spontaneously. Another assumption made in our approach
is that events observed correspond to the correct actions tak-
ing place in the CPSp; this is obviously a limitation.
8 RELATED WORK
Our work touches a number of related areas and makes a
novel contribution in software engineering of adaptive secu-
rity for CPS. First we review existing work that adopts BRS
to model and reason about CPS. Second, we discuss related
approaches that use cyber-physical test-beds and formal
methods to engineer secure CPS. Finally, we compare our
work with existing adaptive security approaches.
8.1 BRS for Modelling Cyber-Physical Spaces
The adoption of BRS for modelling has been considered
extensively in literature. Walton et al. [25] focused on BRS
as a formal model to represent indoor spaces and mobility
of objects and agents in those spaces; this work aims at rea-
soning about path-based navigation tasks. Our group [26]
has used BRS to provide formal semantics to Building
TABLE 1
Space and Time Overhead of Analysis & Planning
# States # Trans Analysis Time # VStates Planning Time
L 2 93 171 3 sec 31 0.1 sec
L 4 1,026 3,703 22 sec 506 0.6 sec
L 6 4,807 24,002 198 sec 2,816 25 sec
Full 24,001 195,613 	8 min 18,008 	18 min
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Information Models, a standard for modelling physical
spaces, in order to support verification of properties of
smart buildings. In contrast, in this paper we use BRS to
select security policies, where hierarchical structures are
considered along with linking between CPSp entities.
BiAgents [27] are a formalism which encompasses
bigraphs for modelling the physical space and abstract alge-
braic structures for the cyber space. Unlike our approach,
which explicitly aims to model the interplay between cyber
and physical spaces, a BiAgents model clearly separates
them, and their interaction is fairly limited. BiAgents have
been specifically used to identify strategies to prevent ill-
defined concurrency behaviours that can emerge from cyber
agents operating in shared physical structures. However,
they are not suitable for identifying security breaches that
can arise from the interplay between cyber and physical
spaces. BRS with sharing [19] are used by Calder et al. [28]
for modelling and reasoning in network topologies and
management systems. Similarly to our approach, BRS are
used to perform analysis at runtime in order to verify access
control policies when network events occur. However, in
this work BRS have not been used to model and reason on
the interplay of physical and cyber spaces, and analysis
results are not used to select security policies to counter
identified violations. Benford et al. [17] use BRS to model
socio-technical and human behaviour aspects alongside sys-
tem behaviour and reason about their interplay. BRS are
extended with probabilistic events, analysis of reaction rules
(e.g., for verifying invariants) and a pattern system. Simi-
larly to our work, bigraphs are used as propositions in a
logic and variables express reaction rules over multiple
bigraph names. However, although we utilise similar
modelling principles of the BRS formalism, we focus on the
realisation of a complete methodology and framework that
ranges from modelling, analysis and automated, adaptive
generation of security policies.
The cornerstone underlying BRS (and thus also enabling
reasoning on CPSp) is the matching problem [9], i.e., condi-
tionally associating bigraphs and generating new instances.
Apart from the closely related fields of graph transformation,
term rewriting or term graph rewriting, we refer to existing
work that has specifically approached bigraph matching.
Several approaches for operating on various forms of
bigraphs exist and can in principle be configured for the
matching constituent of the approach outlined in Section 5.
A SAT based algorithm for the matching problem [29], and
bigraphs with sharing where the place graph can be a DAG
are developed in [19]; a complete bigraphical framework is
realized. BPLTool [30] enables reasoning on BRS systems
with binding, and has an emphasis on implementation cor-
rectness with a matching system based on formally defined
inference rules [31]. A similar approach has been followed in
DBtk [32], a tool for reasoning on directed bigraphs, a form
of bigraphs with directed edges. However, this work does
not address checking properties of bigraphical models.
SBAM [33] implements a variant of stochastic bigraphs, pure
BRS equipped with stochastic semantics. The form of non-
binding bigraphs that we use in this paper is similar, in that
all controls are considered active, and there are no inner
names. BigMC [20] is a model checker for bigraphs; from a
description of a model, it finds all possible future
configurations of this model while checking a specification
expressed as a state matching property against them. The
term language we use draws heavily from BigMC’s. In our
realization we perform checking of CTL properties whose
propositions are bigraphical predicates, and support specifi-
cationswith variables to describe reactions and properties.
8.2 Secure Cyber-Physical Systems
Some research in security of CPS has focused on assessing
the effects of cyber threats against both the physical and the
cyber dimension of networked critical infrastructures [34],
[35] by using existing cyber-physical test-beds. These
approaches focused on modelling dynamical systems such
as sensors or actuators signals, for which timing concerns
are fundamental. Our work instead aims to identify threats
determined by changes of the cyber-physical space and can
be directly applied in practice in all cases where time
needed to enact security policies is negligible with respect
to timing of events occurring in the physical world. This is
the case in access control in smart buildings, where actions
such as locking doors, controlling network connections or
access to services can be performed in a negligible time.
Similarly to our work, other approaches are grounded in
formal methods to identify violations of security require-
ments in CPS. Akella et al. [36] propose an approach to detect
confidentiality breaches determined by the composition of
physical systems with cyber components. Sensitive informa-
tion about a physical component can be inferred through
behavior observation about related cyber components. A
composite model of the CPS is formalised using the Security
Process Algebra [37] and confidentiality properties are
expressed as bisimulation-based non-deducibility—low level
events observations from physical elements should not be
affected when these are composed with cyber components.
Automated detection of confidentiality breaches is per-
formed byusing theCoPSmodel checker [38]. A threatmodel
for CPS [39] has been proposed to incorporate typical charac-
teristics of physical systems, such as survivability to abnor-
mal behavior and the possibility to recover after critically
vulnerable states are reached. A CPS is modeled as a finite,
hybrid timed automaton with faults. An adversary can
exploit a certain set of transitions related to system vulnera-
ble states. The framework is adopted to identify transitions
whose execution must be forbidden and to provide formal
proofs of protocols. Dimkov et al. [40] discuss insider threats
that span physical, cyber and social domains. They build
upon KLAIM [41] dialects for agent interaction and mobility
to formalise insider threats and provide a framework to iden-
tify attack scenarios. However, none of the aforementioned
approaches can automatically suggest security policies to
counter security requirements violations. Furthermore, as far
as we are aware, model checking techniques have not been
used at runtime to discover security breaches determined by
CPSp topological changes.
Extensions to the role-based access control (RBAC) model
have been considered to include topological features into
policy decisions. In particular, Prox-RBAC [42] proposes a
policy language and an enforcement architecture to specify
and enforce constraints according to agents physical proxim-
ity. This view of proximity originally restricted to spatial
concerns was extended [43] to include characteristics
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belonging to the cyber and social spaces such as agents
attributes (e.g., similar roles), social networks (e.g., short
number of hops in a social network), communication chan-
nels, and time. Although a richer notion of proximity, includ-
ing agents’ attributes, social networks and time is relevant
and can be incorporated in our approach, Prox-RBAC does
not allow security analysts to define policies depending on
additional topological relationships such as containment
and reachability. Furthermore, it does not allow specifying
complex temporal constraints describing potential evolu-
tions. Finally, in [43] constraint satisfaction is checked when
the permission to perform an action is requested and while
an agent assumes an active role; this does not allow an opti-
mal adaptation strategy to be selected in advance.
8.3 Adaptive Security and Enforcement
As far as we are aware, existing research on adaptive secu-
rity [44] has not focused on CPS, which can be targeted by
multi-vector attacks exploiting vulnerabilities of both cyber
and physical components. Salehie et al. [45] propose a
requirements-driven approach for dynamically re-estimat-
ing the risk of harm, depending on assets and context
changes. Security threats, attacks and vulnerabilities are
modeled in advance, and predetermined security controls
are adjusted at runtime depending on the varying risk of
harm. Architecture-based self-protection [46] aims to detect
and mitigate security threats based on an architectural
representation of the software that is kept in sync with the
running system. The model provides information related to
the impact of security breaches on the system and allows
engineering security controls by applying specific architec-
tural design patterns. However, these approaches [45], [46]
are based on the assumptions that security controls are pre-
determined and vulnerabilities are determined by individ-
ual system components. In previous preliminary work [7],
we investigated the use of Ambient Calculus [8] to model
the topology of the physical space and perform speculative
threat analysis to reason about the impact that changes in
the topology of the physical space can have on the satisfac-
tion of security requirements. We decided, however, to
abandon this formalism because it does not provide ade-
quate support for modelling and reasoning about the inter-
play between cyber and physical aspects. The properties
that correspond to the requirements in our approach are
encoded as system safety properties, enjoying results on
enforcement mechanisms pioneered by [23]. Notions of con-
trollable and observable environment actions are formally
treated in [47], where decidability of enforceability is stud-
ied. We further distinguish controllable environment
actions in enforceable and preventable. Similar classifica-
tions of actions are common in other areas such as supervi-
sory control theory (e.g., [48]). In practice, enforcement of
the adaptive security policies generated in this paper can be
achieved by configuring edit automata [49].
9 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we proposed an approach for engineering
topology aware adaptive security for cyber-physical sys-
tems, focusing on the interplay between cyber and physical
spaces characterising the operational environment. We used
a form of BRS to represent cyber-physical spaces and their
dynamics, and expressed security requirements as temporal
properties over bigraphical predicates.We performed specu-
lative threat analysis in order to reason about the consequen-
ces of the evolution of the environment on requirements
satisfaction. To achieve this aim, we interpret the BRS over
an LTS representing the evolution of the configuration of the
CPSp. Subsequently, throughmodel checking we identify all
possible states in the evolution of the operational environ-
ment where security requirements are violated. The results
of analysis are used during planning to generate an adapta-
tion strategy consisting of security policies that the system
can take to prevent, circumvent or mitigate violations.
When, due to performance concerns, analysis can only be
performed up to a maximum number of future states, valid-
ity of the adaptation strategy is bound to a lookahead hori-
zon. In this case, we utilise a heuristic method to regenerate
and enact the adaptation strategy at runtime. Our evaluation
demonstrates that our approach can identify and counteract
security requirements violations arising from changes in
both constituents of a CPSp. Moreover, BRS are a suitable
formalism to express such topological relationships. To eval-
uate our approach we automated the analysis and planning
activities. We assessed the applicability of our approach and
its overhead by using a case study formulated following dis-
cussions with an industrial partner concerned with counter-
ing insider threats. Our results are encouraging and provide
evidence of the feasibility of the approach.
We have identified and are pursuing a number of prom-
ising avenues for further investigation. We plan to integrate
our approach with more advanced techniques dealing with
partial observation of environment events and decentraliza-
tion of the enforcement controller. Additionally, we will
relax the atomicity assumptions made regarding security
policy enactment; in particular, we will encode metric tem-
poral characteristics into the underlying logical framework
used to deal with enforcement issues. This will also make
our approach applicable to a wider set of physical environ-
ments that may exhibit inertia and will allow us to select an
adaptative security policy plan that also depends on enact-
ment timings. We are also considering incremental verifica-
tion techniques to handle exogenous changes without
invalidating previous analysis outcomes.
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